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INTRODUCTION
In this Court, as in the Court of Appeals, the
defendants have misstated many of the facts of this case and
have included references to wholly irrelevant facts in an
effort to color the Court's analysis of the legal issues
appropriately presented.

These misrepresentations were

previously identified to the defendants, so their repetition in
this Court must be intentional.
of Appeals) at pp. 1-6.

Appellant's Reply Brief (Court

While there are numerous errors which

have been previously noted, four deserve specific mention here
because they are used by the defendants as the basis for
implying that Mr. Swayne isn't entitled to careful judicial
consideration of his rights.
The defendants repeatedly assert that Mr. Swayne wants
to interfere with an adoption so he can "give" his daughter to
his sister.
false.

(Respondents' Brief at 7, 33). This is entirely

(II Trans, at pp. 28-29).

They assert that Mr. Swayne

refused to sign an acknowledgment of paternity while in the
hospital.

(Respondents' Brief at 5). This statement is

refuted by the testimony of the mother herself.
pp. 11-12, 31-32).

(I Trans, at

Defendants state that Mr. Swayne and
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Ms. Paxman "discussed the possibility of placing the child for
adoption."

(Respondents' Brief at 4).

They did not.

In

March, Penny said her parents wanted the child placed for
adoption.

Steven said it wasn't their decision to make and if

Penny didn't want custody, he did.

(I Trans, at p. 10).

Defendants contend that Steven never offered to support his
child financially.

(Respondents' Brief at 4).

Obviously, if

he offered to accept custody of the child he was offering
financial support.

Furthermore, he certified his willingness

to provide support when his child was less than two weeks old.
(Exhibit 4 from Preliminary Injunction Hearing).
The other errors in the respondents' brief relating to
the number of visits by the child to Mr. Swayne's apartment
(Swayne Depo. at 44-45), the mother's actual basis for
relinquishing her own rights (I Trans, at 37), and the efforts
she went to to hide her actions from Steven (I Trans, at 16),
are all symptomatic of the distortions the defendants are
willing to introduce into the record in an effort to persuade
this Court that it is not important to hear the constitutional
claims of a "22 year old single black man who lives in an
apartment."

(Respondents' Brief at 3).

Mr. Swayne has been asserting his desire for custody
of his infant daughter for two years and has assailed as
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unconstitutional a statutory scheme which forecloses him from
demonstrating his fitness.

It is the defendants who seek to

uphold a statute which forecloses a determination of
Mr. Swayne's fitness, and yet in doing so they imply that he
isn't worthy of having his parental rights protected.

Such a

suggestion highlights the fundamental unfairness of a statute
which vests all unwed mothers with full parental rights, no
matter how unfit they may be, and deprives all unwed fathers of
such rights, without reference to their fitness, if they fail
to file a piece of paper with the State before the mother
renounces her parental rights by placing their child for
adoption.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 VIOLATES
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In evaluating an equal protection challenge to a
statute which contains an express gender-based discrimination,
this Court should closely scrutinize both the asserted
objective of the statutory scheme and the relationship between
the legislation's objective and the discriminatory means used
to achieve that objective.

The United States Supreme Court

enunciated the appropriate analytical framework for gender
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discrimination cases in Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogjm, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).

The Court indicated that

the party seeking to uphold a statute that
classifies individuals on the basis of their
gender must carry the burden of showing an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for
the classification. The burden is met only
by showing at least that the classification
serves "important governmental objectives
and that the discriminatory means employed"
are "substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."
Although the test for determining the
validity of a gender-based classification is
straightforward, it must be applied free of
fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females. Care must
be taken in ascertaining whether the
statutory objective itself reflects archaic
and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the
statutory objective is to exclude or
"protect" members of one gender because they
are presumed to suffer from an inherent
handicap or to be innately inferior, the
objective itself is illegitimate.
458 U.S. 724-725 (citations omitted).
Using this approach, it is questionable whether Utah
Code Ann. § 78-30-4 actually has a legitimate objective.

The

discrimination against unwed fathers in the statute is
apparently based upon the presumption this Court articulated in
Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984),
that in the "common cases" unwed fathers neither desire nor are
willing to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.

681 P.2d

at 207. They are, therefore, excluded from having the
automatic right to play a role in the decision about whether a
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child of theirs should be adopted.

This exclusion, which is

seemingly based upon a presumption that unwed men inherently
care less about their children than unwed women, may render the
State's objective illegitimate.

If the objective of the

statute is to limit the father's parental rights in order to
create more children available for adoption by "increasing
numbers of infertile couples desiring to adopt," as the
defendants imply, then it is unquestionably illegitimate.

The

State has absolutely no legitimate interest in terminating an
unwed father's rights if he is fit to be a parent.

See Stanley

v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Even if the objective of the statute is legitimate,
equal protection analysis requires the Court to
determine whether the requisite direct,
substantial relationship between objective
and means is present. The purpose of
requiring that close relationship is to
assure that the validity of a classification
is determined through reasoned analysis
rather than through the mechanical
application of traditional, often inaccurate,
assumptions about the proper roles of men
and women. The need for the requirement is
amply revealed by reference to the broad
range of statutes already invalidated by
this Court, statutes that relied upon the
simplistic, outdated assumption that gender
could be used as a "proxy for other, more
germane bases of classification,'1- to
establish a link between objective and
classification.
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26
(1982)(citations omitted).
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The Court has indicated that this analysis is required
because
[r]ather than resting on meaningful
considerations, statutes distributing
benefits and burdens between the sexes in
different ways likely reflect out-moded
notions of the relative capabilities of men
and women.
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).
Furthermore, in conducting this analysis in the
instant case, the Court should strictly scrutinize the
rationale offered in support of the connection between the
gender discrimination and the State's objective, because the
right which is being impacted is a fundamental right granted
constitutional protection, as this Court noted in Wells,
supra.

When fundamental rights are infringed upon, the
Equal Protection Clause mandates that the
legislation be finely tailored to serve
substantial state interests, and the
justification offered for any distinction it
draws must be carefully scrutinized.

Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980).
To uphold the discriminatory scheme "the Court must
determine [that] the exclusions are necessary to promote a
compelling state interest."
337 (1972).

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,

See also, Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City,

752 P.2d 884, 888 n.3 (Utah 1988).
It is respectfully submitted that Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-30-4 has not previously been subjected to this type of
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analysis.

While the statute was upheld by this Court in Ellis

v. Social Services Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), the Court did not
articulate the standard by which the Equal Protection review
was conducted.

In Wells v. Childrens Aid Soc. of Utah, 681

P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), the Court suggested that Ellis involved a
rational basis analysis by noting that
implicit in that decision was the holding
that there are reasonable bases for the
classification in the statute. . .and that
these classifications are reasonably
calculated to serve a proper governmental
objective.
681 P.2d at 204.
As demonstrated above, far more is required to
validate a statutory scheme which makes a gender distinction
impacting on a fundamental right.

It is true that in analyzing

the statute under a Due Process challenge this Court
indicated that
[i]n view of the compelling state interest
in the summary determination prescribed in
the statute and of the fact that the
statutory terms are narrowly tailored to
achieve the basic statutory purpose, we hold
[that the statute's provisions] are facially
valid under the Due Process Clause. . .
681 P.2d at 207.
It is respectfully submitted that what is missing from
this analysis is any justification for imposing a burden on all
unwed fathers which is imposed on no unwed mothers.
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In the

equal protection context it is not enough to demonstrate that
the statute advances a compelling state interest.

It must be

established that the gender discrimination used to advance the
State interest is necessary to accomplishing the State's
objective.

This is where the Utah statute fails the equal

protection test.
It has been repeatedly noted that the State has a
strong interest in "ascertaining within a very short time of
birth whether the biological parents (or either of them) are
going to assert their constitutional rights and fulfill their
corresponding responsibilities, or whether adoptive parents
must be substituted."

Wells, supra, at 203.

In what way is

this objective served by exempting all unwed mothers from the
statutory procedure used to identify such parents?

If the

State has an interest in determining the intent of the
biological parents (or either of them), that interest is
manifestly just as strong in knowing the mother's intent as the
father's.

What is it that makes it necessary to place an

additional burden on the father?
It has been suggested that the burden is justified
because the identity or location of the father may be unknown.
This rationale justifies legislative distinctions between
parents whose identity and location are known and those whose
are not, but it does not make it necessary to draw the line on

-8-

the basis of sex only.

A statute which is "narrowly tailored"

to achieve a valid objective simply would not lump known and
identified fathers into the same class as unknown or unlocated
fathers if the true objective was to deal with a problem only
presented by the latter class.
The burdens of the statute aren't drawn on lines
involving the State's "knowledge" of the identity, location or
intent of the parents, they are drawn on the basis of gender
alone.

The statute avoids using the "germane bases" for

classification and substitutes sex instead.

This is precisely

the kind of gender-based discrimination the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected under an equal protection
analysis because the sex differentiation is not fundamental to
the objective identified as the goal of the statute.
Furthermore, the fact that an unwed father can avoid
the discriminatory effect of the statute by filing an
acknowledgment of paternity does not save the statute.

In

Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981), the Court struck
down a Louisiana law which allowed a husband, but not a wife,
to unilaterally sell or encumber jointly held property.

On

appeal, it was argued that because the wife had a right to file
a notice which would deprive her husband of this unilateral
power, having failed to do so she was the "architect of her own
predicament" and should not be heard to complain of the
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statute's discrimination.

The Court summarily rejected this

contention and noted that
the "absence of an insurmountable barrier"
will not redeem an otherwise discriminatory
law. Instead the burden remains on the
party seeking to uphold a statute that
expressly discriminates on the basis of sex
to advance an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for the challenged
classification.
450 U.S. at 461.
In this action the defendants have attempted to
justify the distinction drawn in the statute solely on the
basis of the fact that the mother gives birth to the child and
the father does not.

This fact, they argue, means that the

mother has a "substantial relationship with the child from the
moment of its birth."

Respondent's Brief at p. 28.

Ironically,

in the very next paragraph of their brief the defendants quote
language from the United States Supreme Court which repudiates
this notion.

"Parental rights do not spring full-blown from

the biological connection between parent and child.
require relationships more enduring."

They

Lehr v. Robertson, 463

U.S. 248, 260-61 (1983) .
There can be little question that Utah's statutory
scheme is the product of an assumption that all mothers can be
trusted to endeavor to "do the right thing" for their children,
whereas unwed fathers will be motivated only by self-interest
and not consider the well-being of their offspring.
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The first

premise of this assumption is the variety of "romantic
paternalism" referred to by the Supreme Court in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).

The second prong of the

assumption suffers from the "over- inclusiveness" condemned by
this Court in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 121 (Utah 1986).

In

short, a parent's rights in his (or her) relationship with a
child should be determined on the basis "function-related
factors," not sexual stereotypes.
The easiest way to comprehend the invidious nature of
the discrimination contained in the statute is by examining the
argument made by the defendants in their brief at Point II,
section D.

This is where they assert that Mr. Swayne doesn't

deserve to have his parental rights protected because he hasn't
established that he is a willing father.
Defendants begin this presentation with a false
premise.

They contend that a mother's rights with regard to an

illegitimate child are determined by whether she relinquishes
custody of her child.

This is untrue.

A mother's rights are

fully vested even if she places custody of the child with
someone else (her sister, for example) and leaves the state.
Her rights remain intact until formally terminated by judicial
decree after a hearing on the merits.

If, during a period of

abandonment by the mother, the unwed father had custody of the
child and made the considered decision that the child would be
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best served by a prompt adoption, he could not accomplish this
result by placing the child with an adoption agency.

No amount

of "mature love and concern for the child's best interests and
lifetime care" (Respondent's Brief at p. 33) on the part of the
father could override the mother's vested parental rights.
Next, the defendants denigrate the commitment shown by
Mr. Swayne to his child.

Without belaboring the factual

misrepresentations contained in the brief, plaintiff submits
virtually every "fact" to which defendants point to demonstrate
why Mr. Swayne's rights are not deserving of protection is
equally applicable to the mother whose "substantial
relationship" with the child they contend was established at
the moment of her birth.

There is nothing in the record to

suggest that Ms. Paxman paid any expense of childbirth or
subsequent care of her infant daughter.

She did not file a

notice of her willingness to support her child.

There is no

evidence to suggest she ever offered to marry the father.
was not sexually chaste.

She

She evidenced no desire to live with

the child and, in fact, agreed to "give" her not to close
family members but to strangers.
Under Utah's statute, Steven Swayne is accorded less
protection of his parental rights than the mother of his child
because he is the same sex as a class of fathers to which he
does not belong.

Because this gender-based discrimination
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adversely impacts a fundamental right, federal equal protection
principles mandate that the relationship between the
discrimination and the statute's objective be strictly
scrutinized and, if the gender-based discrimination is not
necessary to achieve the statute's objective, it must be
invalidated.

There is clearly a less restrictive alternative

for dealing with the problems presented by unidentified or
unlocated unwed fathers than by burdening the constitutionally
protected rights of all unwed fathers.
Because the State could deal with the problem
presented by some unwed fathers without resort to an overly
inclusive gender classification, the statute is violative of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See,
generally, Condemarin v. University Hospital,

P.2d

, 107

UAR 5, 21 (Utah 1989)(Zimmerman, J. concurring).
POINT II.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 IS VIOLATIVE
OF ART. I § 24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
Contrary to the assertion of the defendants,
Mr. Swayne has suggested both to this Court and the Court of
Appeals a reason why the "equal protection" guarantee of the
Utah Constitution requires a more stringent level of scrutiny
than the Fourteenth Amendment dictates in gender discrimination
cases.

As pointed out to the Court of Appeals (see Reply Brief

of Appellant, p. 13), Art. IV § 1 of the Utah Constitution
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makes gender a suspect classification and would warrant
application of strict scrutiny review even if this Court had
not indicated that an unwed father's parental rights are
fundamental rights.

Strict scrutiny would be appropriate,

therefore, even if the Court felt that the parental rights of
an unwed father of a newborn were not entitled to constitutional
protection, as the Court of Appeals held.

Because a fundamental

right is involved, strict scrutiny is mandated under both the
federal and state constitutional equal protection provisions.
POINT III.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 VIOLATES THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF BOTH THE UTAH
AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) create
an irrebuttable presumption that an unwed father who doesn't
file an acknowledgment of paternity prior to the mother's
release of the child has abandoned his child and he is
permanently foreclosed from thereafter seeking to establish his
parental rights.

In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973)

the United States Supreme Court stated that "permanent
irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment."
LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Education, 414 U.S. 632, 646
(1974), the Court held that an irrebuttable presumption which
was neither "necessarily [nor] universally true" is violative
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In

of the Due Process Clause.

In LaFleur, the Court also

emphasized the actual holding of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972).

It noted that in Stanley the Court

held that the State could not conclusively
presume any particular unmarried father was
unfit to raise his child; the Due Process
Clause required a more individualized
determination.
414 U.S. at 645.
It doesn't change the analysis of this issue to say
that the statute "deems" failure to file to be a surrender of
rights as opposed to an abandonment of the child.

The

substantive due process question presented is whether the
legislatively mandated conclusion (that the father has no
interest in his parental rights) flows as a matter of course
from the fact established (that the filing wasn't effected
before the mother released the child).

As the United States

Supreme Court decisions demonstrate, due process is a
constitutional limitation on the legislature's ability to
"deem" one status to be the equivalent of another.

Pregnancy

cannot be "deemed" to be the equivalent of disability; being
unmarried cannot be "deemed" the equivalent of being unfit to
be a parent; and failure to file an unknown document cannot
be "deemed" to be the equivalent of intending to abandon
parental rights.
Contrary to the assertion of the defendants, plaintiff
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does not concede the facial constitutionality of the statute.
Plaintiff admits that this Court has held it to be facially
constitutional under a due process analysis.

It is for this

reason that plaintiff also focuses on the application of the
statute to the facts of this case to demonstrate the
fundamental unfairness of the statute's parental rights
termination provision as applied to Mr. Swayne.
The defendants respond to both the due process and
equal protection arguments by asserting that Mr. Swayne's
rights are not entitled to protection because he had no
substantial relationship with his child.

This argument ignores

the issue addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), which is whether the statute
in question adequately protects an unwed father's opportunity
to develop his parental relationship.

Unlike the statute at

issue in Lehr, which would have protected Mr. Swayne's
opportunity interest, Utah's statute permits only one method of
establishing parental interests in unwed fathers and allows for
termination of their rights six months before their children
are even eligible for adoption.

It forecloses an unwed father

from exercising his opportunity interest when the child is days
(or even hours) old.

A statute which doesn't allow a

"reasonable" opportunity to develop the parental relationship
doesn't comport with due process.
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"Absent abandonment of his

interest, a state may not deny a biological father a reasonable
opportunity to establish a relationship with his child."
Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 462 (Ga. 1987).

In re

As stated by

Justice Krivosha in Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services
Bureau, 385 N.W.2d 448 (Neb. 1986),
how can this father, or any father,. . .
live with the child, nurture it, and support
it if his rights to the child can be
terminated during the time that the mother
and child are in the hospital and before he
is afforded any opportunity to establish
those necessary ties?
385 N.W.2d at 455 (Krivosha, J., dissenting).
Mr. Swayne respectfully submits that establishing an
"impossibility" standard as a substitute for one based on
"reasonable opportunity" does not cure the due process
deficiency of the statute.

A father who is in the process of

developing a relationship with his child should not see his
opportunity forfeited because it was not physically impossible
for him to file a document of which he was unaware to protect
rights which he didn't know were being challenged.
POINT IV.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 0-4 MAKES THE
DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT "STATE ACTION" FOR
THE PURPOSES OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The issue of whether the defendants acted under the
color of state law for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
purely a question of federal law.
301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962).

See Marshall v. Sawyer,

The Federal District Court for
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the District of Utah has held, under the facts of this case,
that the defendants acted under color of state law within the
meaning of the statute.

See Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services,

670 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1987).

While that ruling is not

technically the law of the case, Judge Greene's opinion should
be adopted by this Court because it correctly notes that only
the state can terminate parental rights and Utah's statute
invests private parties with the power to effect such a
termination of the rights of an unwed father.

The defendants,

therefore, have been invested by the statute with a power
reserved for the sovereign.

When they exercise this power they

are engaging in an action only the state can take and are,
therefore, properly characterized as "state actors."
The defendants' analysis of this issue is flawed
because they seek to characterize this as an adoption case,
arguing that adoption has not historically been viewed as an
exclusive function of the state.
case.

This is not an adoption

It is a challenge to the constitutionality of Utah's

statutory scheme mandating the termination of the parental
rights of certain unwed fathers.

Parental rights termination

is exclusively a state prerogative and can only be effected
under color of state law.
The defendants' suggestion that § 78-30-4 "renders
parental rights of unwed father no more subject to termination
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POINT V.
ADOPTION BY ACKNOWLEDGMENT HAS BEEN
RAISED IN EVERY COURT WHICH HAS
CONSIDERED THIS CASE
The simplest response to the defendants' erroneous
assertion that the issue of adoption by acknowledgment has been
raised for the first time in this Court is to quote from their
memorandum filed with the Third District Court:
Plaintiff claims to have adopted the child
by acknowledgment pursuant to section
78-30-12.
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at p. 12 n.2.

This issue was briefed both in the trial Court

and the Court of Appeals.

See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at pp.

15-18; Petition for Rehearing at pp. 2-5.

The defendants'

contention to the contrary is one more example of their efforts
to avoid having this Court deal with the issues on the merits.
In addressing the merits of the adoption by
acknowledgment question the defendants make the conclusory
assertion that Mr. Swayne "[did] not come close" to adoption by
acknowledgment without citation to any authority.

They imply

that plaintiff's two visits with his daughter don't constitute
receipt of the child into the father's family, even though this
Court has acknowledged that it is
generally held that a father can satisfy the
receiving requirement by accepting the child
into his home for occasional brief visits.
Slade v. Dennis, 594 P.2d 898, 900 (Utah 1979).
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CONCLUSION

Steven Swayne's parental rights were terminated not
because he lacked sincere concern for his daughter but rather
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because the mother of his child was persuaded by her parents
that she should give up the baby.

A statute which vests unwed

mothers with the right to decide about adoption but which does
not accord the same right to unwed fathers who have
demonstrated a desire to form a true parental relationship is
fundamentally unfair.

The defendants' efforts to lead this

Court to believe that Steven Swayne is simply a disinterested
interloper who is attempting to thwart an adoption but not to
establish a true parental relationship with his daughter
underscores the unfairness of the statute and its inequality in
the treatment of men and women.

While the defendants assert

that Mr. Swayne never demonstrated concern for his child, the
mother of the child knew this to be false.

She realized the

day after she signed the release, after seeing Steven and his
daughter together, that she had been wrong to cause his rights
to be terminated.
After seeing Steven that day, that's when I
started thinking that I wasn't fair to
Steven because I had known that we was
concerned with the baby. I just felt that
he had no concern for me. So later that
night, Tuesday night, I was starting to
realize that I should have thought through a
little more of what I had done, and we
wouldn't be here today.
(I. Trans, at 43-44).
Utah's statute precluded Steven Swayne from
participating in the decision of whether his baby was going to
be placed for adoption and vested full authority for that
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